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REGULATING DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER 

ADVERTISING WITH TORT LAW: IS THE 

LAW FINALLY CATCHING UP 

WITH THE MARKET? 

TIMOTHY S. HALL* 
ABSTRACT 
Should direct-to-consumer advertising ofprescription drugs im­
pose any tort duty on the drug manufacturer and advertiser to ensure 
that the advertisements present a fair picture of the risks and benefits 
of the drug? Until very recently, the answer of American courts has 
overwhelmingly been "no." However, recently there has been both a 
rise in concern over the content and effects of direct-to-consumer ad­
vertisements and signs of an emerging trend among courts to con­
sider the possibility that a drug company that chooses to bypass 
traditional avenues of communication of information about prescrip­
tion drugs should bear responsibility in tort for the content of its di­
rect communications with consumers. This emerging trend has not 
yet reached critical mass, however, and in at least one case, the pen­
dulum has arguably swung too far in the opposite direction. This 
Article will discuss recent developments in the litigation surrounding 
direct-to-consumer advertising, and suggest avenues of development 
for tort law in this important area. 
The American experiment with product-specific, direct-to-con­
sumer advertising of prescription drugs is, as of this writing, approx­
imately twenty years old. l Despite two decades of increasing 
spending on such advertisements? reviews of this practice are de­
cidedly mixed. Few other industrialized nations permit such adver­
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of 
Louisville Louis D. Brandeis School of Law. 
1. See Timothy S. Hall, Bypassing the Learned Intermediary: Potential Liability 
for Failure to Warn in Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 2 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL'y 449, 451-52 (1993). 
2. Spending on direct-to-consumer advertising in 2007 was estimated at $4.8 bil­
lion, up three-hundred percent from 1997. Stephanie Saul, For Jarvik Heart Pioneer, 
Drug Ads Raise Profile and Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at AI; see also Steve 
Lohr, Publications on Fitness and Health Head to Web, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2007, at 
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tisement,3 and there is little data indicating that the practice of 
advertising prescription drugs directly to consumers improves 
health outcomes, enhances the physician-patient relationship, or 
has any positive effect other than improving sales of pharmaceutical 
products.4 Indeed, substantial questions remain about whether di­
rect-to-consumer advertisement as currently practiced violates the 
first principle of medical ethics, primum non nocere-first, do no 
harm.s Critics of direct-to-consumer advertising argue that such 
advertisements do not present a balanced picture of a drug's risks 
and benefits; that they undermine the physician-patient relation­
ship; and that they inappropriately drive up demand for drugs that 
provide larger profit margins, not greater therapeutic benefit.6 Re­
search has shown that advertised drugs are disproportionately 
newly approved drugs, which may still be under patent protection 
and thus offer larger profit margins than other drugs in the same 
therapeutic class.7 
In spite of these concerns, there has been little effective regula­
tion of the direct-to-consumer advertising market to date. How­
ever, two recent developments suggest that the law may be catching 
up to the regulatory needs of this market. First, in May 2008 Con­
gress took note of the criticisms of direct-to-consumer advertising 
C1 (stating that Internet "advertising for prescription drugs has increased nearly five­
fold in the last four years, to $163 million"). 
3. See Alan Cassels, Canada May Be Forced to Allow Direct to Consumer Adver­
tising, 332 BRIT. MED. 1.1469 (2006); Rory Watson, EU Health Ministers Reject Propo­
sal for Limited Direct to Consumer Advertising, 326 BRIT. MED. 1. 1284 (2003); Erin J. 
Asher, Comment, Lesson Learned from New Zealand: Pro-Active Industry Shift To­
wards Self-Regulation of Direct to Consumer Advertising Will Improve Compliance with 
FDA, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 599, 600 (2006). 
4. Kate Pickert, Do Consumers Understand Drug Ads?, TIME, May 15, 2008, 
http://www.time.com/health/article/0.8599.1806946.00.html(reporting that every one­
thousand dollars invested in direct-to-consumer advertising results in twenty-four new 
prescriptions for the advertised drug). 
5. See generally THOMAS L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (5th ed. 2001) (discussing the ethical basis for the traditional med­
ical precept of: "First, Do No Harm"). 
6. See, e.g., Stephanie Saul & Alex Berenson, Lipitor Maker Digs in to Fight 
Generic Rival, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2007, at Al (describing drug manufacturer Pfizer's 
increased use of direct-to-consumer advertisements to counter the market effect of 
FDA approval of a generic competitor to its flagship cholesterol drug Lipitor); Stepha­
nie Saul, Sleep Drugs Found Only Mildly Effective, but Wildly Popular, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 23, 2007, at F4 (describing reports that, despite advertising claims of increased 
safety, advertised drugs, in fact, had many of the same problems as competing drugs). 
7. See generally Julie M. Donohue, Marisa Cevasco & Meredith B. Rosenthal, A 
Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 673 (2007). 
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with hearings addressing potential problems with three specific tele­
vision advertisements for prescription drugs and a legislative propo­
sal to restrict direct-to-consumer advertising.8 Second, in the last 
two years, two courts have explicitly focused on the direct-to-con­
sumer advertising market by adopting changes to the tort law gov­
erning prescription drugs.9 This Article will discuss these changes, 
with an emphasis on the regulatory potential of tort law. 
In May 2008, Congressman John Dingell, Chair of the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee, held hearings to explore issues 
surrounding direct-to-consumer drug advertising, with particular fo­
cus on advertisements for three drugs: Lipitor, Vytorin, and 
Procrit.1Q The first two of these drugs are designed to lower choles­
terol levels and thus prevent heart disease, and the latter is de­
signed to combat anemia in connection with chemotherapy.!l 
The Lipitor advertisement featured heart researcher Robert 
Jarvik as pitchman for the drug.12 Criticism of this ad campaign 
focused on the facts that at the time he was recommending Lipitor 
to potential consumers, Jarvik was not a licensed physician; that he 
stated in the advertisement that he himself took the drug, which 
was not accurate at the time the ads aired; and that a scene in the ad 
that purported to be Jarvik rowing on a lake was staged with a body 
double.13 
Congressman Bart Stupak stated at the hearing that while ad­
vertisements for Vytorin were generating five-billion dollars in sales 
in 2007, studies indicating that Vytorin was no more effective than 
other, less expensive available treatments were not released by the 
S. See Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: Marketing, Education, or Deception?: 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy 
and Commerce, 1l0th Congo (200S) [hereinafter Direct-to-Consumer Hearings]. 
9. See Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D.N.M. 200S); State ex 
reI. Johnson & Johnson Corp. V. Karl, 647 S.E.2d S99 (W. Va. 2007). 
10. Alison Bass, A Dose of Honesty in Prescription Drug Ads, BOSTON GLOBE, 
June 2, 200S, at A15. Congressional hearings have also been held on the subject of 
direct-to-consumer advertisements for medical devices. See Barry Meier, Consumer 
Ads for Medical Devices Subject of Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 200S, at C12. 
Because the regulatory frameworks for medical devices and prescription drugs are dif­
ferent, this Article will focus exclusively on prescription drugs. However, many of the 
issues raised herein are paralleled in the market for medical devices. 
11. Bass, supra note 10, at Al5. 
12. See George J. Annas, Health Care Reform in America: Beyond Ideology, 5 
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 441 (200S). 
13. Direct-to-Consumer Hearings, supra note S, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Bart 
Stupak, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/Subcommittees/ 
OI-Stupak/050S0S.0Lhrg.DTC.pdf. 
336 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31 :333 
manufacturer.14 Congressman Stupak also alleged that the adver­
tisements for Procrit intimated possible off-label uses of the drug, 
the advertising of which is "prohibited by the FDA,"15 but that the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) did not intervene to stop 
this inappropriate marketing.16 
In follow-up letters to pharmaceutical companies and the Phar­
maceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Congressmen 
Stupak and Dingell requested that drug manufacturers commit to 
six specific steps in order to improve the quality of direct-to-con­
sumer advertisements and reduce the instance of deceptive and 
misleading advertisements. These were: (1) to follow the American 
Medical Association's (AMA) guidelines regarding the use of 
health professionals in direct-to-consumer advertisements; (2) to 
not market directly to consumers until valid data regarding out­
comes are available for a drug; (3) to adopt a two-year moratorium 
on direct-to-consumer advertisements; (4) to not market off-label 
uses for products in direct-to-consumer advertisements; (5) to pro­
vide a toll-free telephone number for reporting adverse effects of 
medical products17 in all direct-to-consumer advertisements; and 
(6) to include any FDA-mandated "black box" warnings in direct­
to-consumer advertisements. I8 
FDA oversight of direct-to-consumer advertisements has been 
inadequate. In fact, despite the substantial increases in the indus­
try's direct marketing budgets, the pace of warning letters sent by 
the FDA to pharmaceutical manufacturers questioning the content 
14. Id. at 2. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. The FDA currently maintains such a reporting service called MedWatch. See 
MedWatch, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, http://www.fda.gov/medwatch (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2009). 
18. Letter from Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy & Com­
merce, and Rep. Bart Stupak, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigation, 
to William C. Weldon, Chairman & CEO, Johnson & Johnson (May 20, 2008), http:// 
energycommerce .house .govIPress_11 O/llO-Itr.052008.JohnsonandJoh nson. pdf. 
A "black box" warning is a warning of known, serious risks associated with a drug's 
use. These warnings are mandated as part of the drug-approval process for serious risks 
known at the time of approval. See Henry Grabowski & Y. Richard Wang, Do Faster 
Food and Drug Administration Drug Reviews Adversely Affect Patient Safety?: An Anal­
ysis of the 1992 Prescription Drug User Fee Act, 51 J. L. & ECON. 377, 384 (2008). These 
warnings can also be added to a drug's required labeling if risks are discovered after the 
drug is approved. See Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting Medical Judgment?: False Assump­
tions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. 
& TECH. 61, 79 n.58 (2008) ("Black box warnings are the most severe warnings the 
FDA can issue for a drug that is to remain on the market despite newly discovered 
adverse effects. "). 
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of their ads has dropped dramatically in the last decade_19 Only 21 
such letters were sent in 2006, compared with 142 in 1997.20 While 
one could argue that this represents a trend towards more appropri­
ate drug advertisement, the problems with current drug advertise­
ments pointed out in the recent congressional hearings suggest 
otherwise.21 
Recently proposed legislation would limit the ability of drug 
manufacturers to advertise directly to consumers within a certain 
number of years of the approval of a new drug by the FDA.22 This 
issue also became a minor point in the Democratic primaries lead­
ing up to the 2008 presidential election.23 The most recent version 
of this proposal was introduced in the House of Representatives by 
Representative Rosa DeLauro of Connecticut.24 This bill would 
prohibit direct-to-consumer advertising within three years of FDA 
approval of a new drug.25 Exceptions would provide for earlier ad­
vertising of a drug if it is determined that such advertising "would 
have an affirmative value to public health."26 Additionally, an ex­
tension of the ban beyond the initial three years would occur "if ... 
the drug ... has significant adverse health effects based on post­
approval studies, risk-benefit analyses, adverse event reports, the 
scientific literature, any clinical or observational studies, or any 
other appropriate resource."27 The proposal would also require 
any direct-to-consumer advertising to contain "a fair balance ... of 
the benefits and the risks associated with the drug."28 
19. Donahue, Cevasco & Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 676-77. 
20. Id. 
21. See Letter from Rep. John D. DingelJ, Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, & Bart Stupak, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigation, to 
Hon. W.J. Tauzin, President & CEO, Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. (May 20, 2008), 
http://energycommerce.house.govlPress_1l0/11O-ltr.052008.PRMA.pdf (stating that the 
Committee "did not obtain adequate assurances that [drug manufacturers] would re­
duce misleading and deceptive DTC advertisements"). 
22. See Responsibility in Drug and Device Advertising Act of 2008, H.R. 6151, 
1l0th Congo (2008). 
23. See Edwards Unveils Plan to Control Drug Advertising, REUTERS, Oct. 28, 
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN28439707. 
24. See Responsibility in Drug and Device Advertising Act of 2008. Previous 
legislative proposals have suggested a two-year moratorium. They have also attempted 
to use the tax system to disincentivize direct-to-consumer advertisements by denying 
deductions for advertisements that fail to present the risks of the drug or occur within 
two years of the drug's approval. See Fair Balance Prescription Drug Advertisement 
Act of 2007, H.R. 2823, 1l0th Congo (2007). 
25. See Responsibility in Drug and Device Advertising Act § 2(a)(2). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
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For those who believe that the costs of direct-to-consumer ad­
vertising outweigh the benefits, the current state of affairs seems 
grim. Spending on this advertising, while still dwarfed by expendi­
tures on other forms of drug promotion, is rising rapidly, and, ac­
cording to recent research, is effective in promoting-perhaps 
overpromoting-use of the advertised drugs.29 The drugs chosen 
for direct-to-consumer advertisements seem to be chosen not ac­
cording to the likely benefit to the potential patients, but according 
to the need to promote newly approved drugs, which may them­
selves have unknown or unclear risk profiles compared to others on 
the markepo Despite these factors, there has been significantly less 
enforcement of such advertising by the regulatory agencies in the 
past decade.31 Additionally, proposals for more strict regulation, 
such as bans on advertisements during the first years of a drug's 
approval,32 are of questionable constitutionality.33 What, if any­
thing, can be done to minimize future abuses of American drug 
manufacturers' privilege to communicate directly with potential 
consumers of their drugs? 
This Article argues that the answer is found in the application 
of tort law to direct-to-consumer advertising. However, in order to 
achieve meaningful regulation of direct-to-consumer advertising 
through tort law, the courts must be convinced to substantially alter 
the application of the so-called "learned intermediary rule,"34 
which, as currently applied by the majority of courts, prevents virtu­
ally all failure-to-warn suits by consumers against pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. This Article will briefly discuss the learned inter­
mediary rule in the context of pharmaceutical failure-to-warn liabil­
ity, and will set forth a proposed change to the application of the 
rule that would enable consumers of prescription drugs to hold drug 
29. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
30. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
31. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
32. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. 
33. Substantial questions exist as to whether any ban on direct-to-consumer ad­
vertisements would be enforceable given current commercial speech doctrine under the 
First Amendment. See, e.g., Miriam Shuchman, Drug Risks and Free Speech-Can 
Congress Ban Consumer Drug Ads?, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2236 (2007). 
34. The learned intermediary rule allows manufacturers to rely on the skill and 
expertise of an intermediary to furnish appropriate warnings to the consumer of the 
product. In the case of prescription drugs, "[t]he obligation of a manufacturer to warn 
about risks attendant to the use of drugs and medical devices that may be sold only 
pursuant to a health care provider's prescription traditionally has required warnings 
directed to health care providers and not to patients." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODUcrS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. b (1997). 
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manufacturers liable for deceptive advertising in appropriate 
circumstances. 
The current regulatory system is ineffective to ensure a safe 
and efficient flow of information about drugs to the potential con­
sumers of those drugs. Policymakers face two fundamental options 
if the status quo is inadequate: either ban the practice of direct-to­
consumer advertising altogether or further regulate the practice. A 
total ban on direct-to-consumer advertising is suboptimal for two 
reasons. First, as several commentators have suggested, the First 
Amendment may operate to protect the type of speech in which 
pharmaceutical manufacturers are engaged.35 Second, a ban ig­
nores the substantial potential benefits of an increased flow of in­
formation to consumers of prescription drugs.36 For these reasons, 
improved regulation of direct-to-consumer advertisement is a supe­
rior alternative to an outright ban on the practice. 
However, the remaining question is how to implement effec­
tive regulation. The most recent legislative proposal has been for a 
temporal ban on direct-to-consumer advertisement. This proposal 
would ban direct advertisement of a prescription drug within two 
years of FDA approva1.37 It has the benefit of addressing the per­
verse incentive in the direct-to-consumer advertising market re­
garding which drugs get advertised. Generally, the tendency has 
been for advertisements to disproportionately feature drugs that ei­
ther generate higher revenue for the manufacturer-drugs that 
have been recently approved are more likely to enjoy patent pro­
tection, and correspondingly higher profit margins38-or drugs that 
35. Shuchman, supra note 33, at 223S. 
36. See Jaclyn Carole Hill, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Beyond: Ex­
ploring Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising in the New Millennium, 72 DEF. COUNS. 
J. 362, 376 (2005) ("[T]he public should ultimately realize that the greater good of the 
community is served by allowing for the advertisement of prescription drugs."); see also 
Jennifer Girod, Note, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: An Efficient Protection for 
Patients Past and Present, 40 IND. L. REV. 397 (2007); Corey Schaecher, Comment, Ask 
Your Doctor if This Product is Right for You, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 421 (2007). 
37. See supra notes 24-2S and accompanying text. 
3S. See, e.g., Jessie Cheng, Note, An Antitrust Analysis of Product Hopping in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, lOS COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (200S) ("In the prescription 
drug market, a patent holder-usually the brand name drug manufacturer that devel­
oped the pioneer drug, like Eli Lilly-has time-limited, exclusive rights to market its 
patented drug, allowing it to realize hefty profits. Upon the patent's expiration ... 
market competition replaces the previously lawful monopoly: Manufacturers of generic 
drugs (generic manufacturers) enter the market, and the incumbent brand name manu­
facturer may face a steep drop in profits and market share." (footnotes omitted)). 
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are attempting to tap into new markets for which no competing 
treatments exist.39 
Two main critiques of direct-to-consumer advertising arise 
from these practices. The first critique is that direct-to-consumer 
advertisements tend to overmedicalize conditions previously con­
sidered within the range of "normal" human experience.4o This in­
creases drug sales, but also has the effect of driving up the cost of 
health care and diverting health care resources from more serious 
health issues. The second critique stems from the fact that new 
drugs often have incomplete safety data despite their FDA ap­
proval. Thus, direct advertisement may lead to overuse of these 
products by misrepresenting the risk-benefit calculation versus 
other treatment options in the marketplace.41 
Given these perverse incentives, the proposal to temporally re­
strict direct-to-consumer advertisements has some appeal. How­
ever, this proposal has not yet been successful in Congress, and 
there are commentators who argue that such restrictions would run 
afoul of the constitutional protection given to commercial speech.42 
Even if such legislative proposals were adopted and found to be 
constitutional in inevitable court challenges, such a ban would not 
address remaining issues such as off-label promotions and general 
overpromotion of the benefits versus harms of a drug. Moreover, 
39. For example, the diagnosis of "restless leg syndrome" has been challenged as 
being driven in part by drug companies' desire to promote pharmaceutical treatment 
for this condition. See, e.g., Steven Woloshin & Lisa M. Schwartz, Giving Legs to Rest­
less Legs: A Case Study of How the Media Helps Make People Sick, 3 PLoS MED. 452 
(2006), http://www.plosmedicine.orgiarticie/info%3Adoi % 2F1 0.1371 % 2Fjournal. pmed. 
0030170. 
40. See generally id. and other "disease-mongering" articles in that symposium. 
41. An example of this phenomenon is the marketing and subsequent withdrawal 
from market of the pain drug Vioxx, which was widely prescribed despite, as later data 
showed, its greater risk of cardiac side effects and lack of greater efficacy than other 
pain drugs then on the market. The marketing withdrawal and litigation surrounding 
Vioxx has been widely discussed. See, e.g., David R. Culp & Isobel M. Berry, Merck 
and the Vioxx Debacle: Deadly Loyalty, 22 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1 (2007); 
Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vi­
oxx and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'y L. & ETHICS 741 (2005); Margaret 
Gilhooley, Vioxx's History and the Need for Better Procedures and Better Testing, 37 
SETON HALL L. REV. 941 (2007); Ronald M. Green, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising 
and Pharmaceutical Ethics: The Case of Vioxx, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 749 (2006); 
Jennifer Wolsing, The Vioxx Litigation: Disincentivizing Patient Safety Through Misdi­
rected Tort Rules, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 209 (2008). 
42. See, e.g., Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to 
Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2008); Mark I. 
Schwartz, To Ban or Not to Ban-That is the Question: The Constitutionality ofa Mora­
torium on Consumer Drug Advertising, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1 (2008). 
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in the absence of a private enforcement mechanism, it is by no 
means clear that the FDA has either the resources or the inclination 
to adequately police any new restrictions on direct-to-consumer 
advertisements. 
I have in the past proposed, and continue to advocate for, a 
solution that requires no legislative action and thus bypasses the 
current legislative gridlock on this issue.43 I propose that common 
law tort doctrine embrace its regulatory potential in the context of 
direct-to-consumer advertisements. To date, the majority of courts 
addressing the issue have been unwilling to impose tort liability for 
harms arising from direct-to-consumer advertisements, due in large 
part to a historic failure to adapt common law doctrine to the needs 
of the current marketplace for pharmaceutical products.44 How­
ever, in 2007 and 2008, gaps have appeared in the wall of protection 
surrounding drug manufacturers. 
The most important legal doctrine governing liability of pre­
scription drug manufacturers to the ultimate users of their products 
is the learned intermediary rule.45 Products liability law generally 
holds the manufacturer of a defective product liable to an end user 
harmed through the use of the product.46 In the prescription drug 
context, the defective nature of the product is generally not a manu­
facturing defect, but rather a lack of an appropriate warning about 
the relative risks and benefits of the product.47 By their very na­
ture, prescription drugs can present a danger of harm to the user 
even when used properly.48 As inherently dangerous products, pre­
scription drugs do not generate liability for harms caused by the 
proper use of the product, so long as they are accompanied by ade­
quate warnings and instructions.49 The provision of such warnings 
43. See Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New 
Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193 (2004). 
44. See generally id. (providing a complete account of changes in the pharmaceu­
tical marketplace, including, but not limited to, the rise of direct-to-consumer advertis­
ing and the implications for tort law). 
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcrS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. b (1997); 
see supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcrS LIABILITY § 1 ("One engaged 
in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a 
defective product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the 
defect. "). 
47. Id. § 6(b)(3) cmt. a ("Until recently, courts refused to impose liability based 
on defective designs of drugs ... sold only by prescription."). 
48. Id. § 6(b)(3) cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k 
(1984). 
49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcrs LIABILITY § 6(d). 
342 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:333 
and instructions shifts the risk from the manufacturer of the prod­
uct to the user who freely chose to use the producPo 
In the vast majority of non-pharmaceutical settings, manufac­
turers must deliver warnings and instructions to the end user of a 
product in order to be legally protected.51 However, because pre­
scription drugs are not ordinarily available directly to patients, but 
are only available through the intervention of a licensed physician 
as a gatekeeper, courts have traditionally held that the necessary 
warnings must be given to the prescribing physician and not to the 
end user of the drug. 52 Therefore, the provision of adequate warn­
ings to the physician is a defense to a products liability claim 
brought against the manufacturer by a patient harmed by the 
drug.53 This is the learned intermediary rule, and it acknowledges 
that, unlike most other products, the decision whether to use a pre­
scription drug is not made solely by the patient, but rather is made 
in conjunction with and after consultation with a physician upon 
whose education and training a patient relies to make a decision 
when selecting an appropriate drug.54 Because pharmacology is 
such a complex field, the patient is not considered capable of under­
standing the drug's warnings and instructions or making rational 
decisions based on the benefits and risks of the drug without the 
intervention of a physician.55 
The learned intermediary rule makes sense for a certain vision 
of the physician-patient relationship.56 However, as described in 
more detail elsewhere,57 the modern doctor-patient relationship 
often deviates from that ideal in what should be legally significant 
ways. Except to a very limited extent, the law has not recognized 
these changes in the health care marketplace. These changes in­
clude, in addition to the proliferation of direct-to-consumer adver­
50. As one recent commentator put it, provision of effective warnings "recast[ ] 
the user as the least-cost-avoider of injury." See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. 
Appel, Effective Communication of Warnings in the Workplace: Avoiding Injuries in 
Working with Industrial Materials, 73 Mo. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcrS LIABILITY § 2(c) cmt. i 
("[D]epending on the circumstances, Subsection c may require that instructions and 
warning be given not only to purchasers, users and consumers, but also to others who a 
reasonable seller should know will be in a position to reduce or avoid the risk of harm." 
(emphasis added)). 
52. Id. § 6. 
53. Id. 
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1984). 
55. Hall, supra note 43, at 202-03. 
56. Id. at 195-96. 
57. Id. 
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tlsmg over the last twenty years, the following: (1) increased 
emphasis on the patient as ultimate decision-maker in the health 
care context, as opposed to more traditionally authoritative models 
of the physician-patient relationship;58 (2) massive investment by 
the pharmaceutical industry in research and development of new 
drug therapies;59 (3) an increased emphasis within the pharmaceuti­
cal industry on so-called "lifestyle" drugs;60 and (4) increased avail­
ability of prescription drugs through nontraditional and often illegal 
outlets, including Internet pharmacies and importation from other 
countries.61 Although all of these changes suggest that the learned 
intermediary rule has been outstripped by market developments, 
this Article focuses on the effect of direct-to-consumer 
advertisements. 
The law permits drug companies to communicate directly with 
patients, thus generating demand for the advertised drugs, but it 
insulates them from liability to those same patients based upon 
those communications. Therefore, the law currently sets up a sig­
nificant market distortion that overincentivizes expenditure on di­
rect-to-consumer advertisements. 
In 1999, just as the pharmaceutical industry's investments in 
direct-to-consumer advertisements were skyrocketing,62 one court 
took note of the effect of direct-to-consumer advertising on the 
physician-patient relationship and the learned intermediary rule. In 
Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc., the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
held that direct advertisement of Norplant, an implantable long­
term contraceptive drug, prevented the application of the learned 
intermediary rule to the plaintiff's claim as a matter of New Jersey 
law.63 In limiting the application of the learned intermediary rule, 
the court relied explicitly on the intentional act of the drug manu­
58. Id. at 226-28. 
59. Id. at 228. 
60. Id. at 229-30. The term "lifestyle drug" refers to therapies developed or mar­
keted for cosmetic or functional enhancement rather than for the treatment of a disease 
as that term is traditionally interpreted. See generally Kim H. Finley, Comment, Life, 
Liberty, and the Pursuit of Viagra?: Demand for "Lifestyle" Drugs Raises Legal and 
Public Policy Issues, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 837 (2000). Classes of drugs deemed "lifestyle 
drugs" by the Medicaid program "include weight loss, weight gain, infertility, drugs for 
cosmetic purposes or hair growth, drugs for symptomatic relief of coughs and colds, 
smoking cessation products, and vitamins and minerals." Joshua Parsons Cohen et aI., 
Role of Budget Impact in Drug Reimbursement Decisions, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL'y & 
L. 225, 233 (2008) (citation omitted). 
61. Hall, supra note 43, at 230-3l. 
62. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
63. Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1256 (N.J. 1999). 
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facturer in "seek[ing] to influence a patient's choice" through "di­
rect claims to consumers for the efficacy of its product" as a 
justification for imposition of a duty to warn the drug consumer of 
the risks attendant upon use of the drug, rather than merely warn­
ing the prescribing physician.64 
After Perez, commentators opined that other courts would fol­
low the lead of New Jersey in limiting the protection of the learned 
intermediary rule for drug manufacturers who engage in direct-to­
consumer marketing.65 However, for almost a decade after the 
Perez case, despite invitations by litigants to extend Perez to other 
jurisdictions, no other court chose to follow Perez's lead. That state 
of affairs may now be changing. 
In the past two years, two more courts have explicitly declined 
to extend the protection of the learned intermediary rule to pre­
scription drug manufacturers, citing, inter alia, the prevalence of di­
rect-to-consumer advertising to justify their holdings. First, in the 
case of Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl,66 the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia, after a thorough discussion of the direct­
to-consumer advertising market67 and an analysis of the adoption of 
the learned intermediary rule in other American jurisdictions,68 
concluded that the "justifications for the learned intermediary doc­
trine [are] largely outdated and unpersuasive. "69 It declined to 
adopt the rule as part of the common law of tort in West VirginiaJo 
In Karl, the plaintiff's decedent was prescribed Propulsid, a 
drug manufactured by Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc.71 Unfortu­
nately, she died three days after taking the drugJ2 Plaintiff sued 
both the prescribing physician and the drug manufacturer under 
products liability and medical negligence theories of liability.73 
Janssen moved for summary judgment on the grounds of the 
learned intermediary doctrine, but the trial court denied this mo­
tion because the learned intermediary rule had not been explicitly 
64. Jd. at 1247. 
65. Jd. 
66. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007). 
67. Jd. at 907-09. 
68. Jd. at 903-05. 
69. Jd. at 906. 
70. Jd. at 901. 
71. Jd. 
72. Jd. 
73. Jd. 
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adopted by the West Virginia's highest courtJ4 The lower court 
also denied a motion in limine to exclude certain evidence relating 
to the question of whether the manufacturer had a duty to directly 
warn the consumer of the drug's dangersJ5 Janssen appealed both 
of these rulings to West Virginia's Supreme Court by filing a peti­
tion for a writ of prohibition,76 which the court deniedJ7 
In denying the writ of prohibition and allowing the lower 
court's orders to stand, the West Virginia court relied on two main 
arguments. First, the court articulated a different calculation as to 
how many jurisdictions have in fact adopted the learned intermedi­
ary rule. Unlike the court in In re Norplant, which calculated that 
the doctrine has been adopted in forty-eight states,78 or the court in 
Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., which concluded that thirty-four states have 
adopted the rule,79 the Karl court, using a somewhat more restric­
tive methodology, concluded that only twenty-two states have de­
finitively adopted the rule-twenty-one by judicial adoption and 
one by statute.80 The Karl court reached this result by looking only 
to binding pronouncements by the highest court in each state, and 
did not include lower court decisions as the other opinions had.81 
Thus, the Karl court viewed the learned intermediary rule as a doc­
trine on which the states are split roughly down the middle, rather 
than the virtual unanimity that prevails in other courts' views. 
Second, the Karl court gave special consideration to changes in 
the pharmaceutical marketplace and the physician-patient relation­
ship since the rule was first articulated and widely adopted. The 
court concluded that two changes in particular merit rejection of 
the rule: "the initiation and intense proliferation of direct-to-con­
sumer advertising, along with its impact on the physician-patient 
relationship, and the development of the internet as a common 
method of dispensing and obtaining prescription drug informa­
tion. "82 The court noted that these "[ s ]ignificant changes in the 
74. Id. In the past, several federal courts had predicted that West Virginia would, 
in fact, adopt the learned intermediary rule, should the question be presented. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. !d. 
78. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 806 
(E.D. Tex. 2002). 
79. Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 768 (Ky. 2004). 
80. Karl, 647 S.E.2d at 903-04. The one state adopting the rule by statute is North 
Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-5(c) (2007). 
81. Karl, 647 S.E.2d at 903-04. 
82. !d. at 907. 
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drug industry have post-dated the adoption of the learned interme­
diary doctrine"83 and specifically noted that "[s]ince the 1997 
proliferation of [direct-to-consumer] advertising, only four high 
courts have adopted the learned intermediary doctrine."84 Further­
more, those four courts failed to give "thorough consideration to 
... direct-to-consumer advertising"85 when deciding to adopt the 
rule. 
Interestingly, there is no mention in the Karl opinion of a claim 
by the plaintiff that the decedent saw, relied upon, or was unduly 
influenced by direct-to-consumer advertising. Although the attor­
ney for the plaintiff argued in the brief that the existence of direct­
to-consumer advertising for Propulsid should justify an exception to 
the learned intermediary rule,86 the brief contains no allegation that 
the decedent relied on, or even saw, that advertising in the course 
of being prescribed and taking the medication that allegedly caused 
her death. 
After Karl, one other court has expressly declined to adopt the 
learned intermediary rule, although in a different context and for 
different reasons. In Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,87 the Federal Dis­
trict Court for the District of New Mexico refused to certify the 
question of whether New Mexico would adopt the learned interme­
diary rule as a matter of state tort law, and instead predicted that 
the Supreme Court of New Mexico would not adopt the rule. Al­
though the Rimbert case does not include claims relating to direct­
to-consumer advertising, the court discussed the Karl opinion in 
reaching its decision.88 The Rimbert court relied more strongly on 
its interpretation of the New Mexico courts' strict liability jurispru­
dence, concluding that "the learned-intermediary doctrine ... is 
fundamentally inconsistent with New Mexico's strict-liability juris­
prudence."89 The Rimbert court reasoned that since the learned in­
termediary rule insulates the drug manufacturer from liability, it 
necessarily shifts that liability onto the physician, undermining the 
goal of strict liability, which is "to ensure that the risk of loss for 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 908-09. 
85. Id. at 909; see also Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829 (Conn. 2001); Mc­
Combs v. Synthes, 587 S.E.2d 594 (Ga. 2003); Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758 (Ky. 
2004); Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827 (Neb. 2000). 
86. Brief of Respondent at 26-27, Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 
899 (W. Va. 2006) (No. 33211). 
87. Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (D.N.M. 2008). 
88. Id. at 1193-94. 
89. Id. at 1215. 
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Injury resulting from defective products is borne by the 
suppliers."90 
Despite the Karl and Rimbert opinions, not all recent learned 
intermediary rule decisions have taken the side of restricting the 
application of the rule. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, in 
Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., adopted the rule for the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky.91 The court did so over the dissent of Justice Winter­
sheimer, who urged the court to take more account of changes in 
the medical marketplace, such as the rise of direct-to-consumer ad­
vertising.92 Similarly, in Porter v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,93 the District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia rejected a plaintiff's 
claim that Georgia courts would "reject the learned intermediary 
doctrine and require direct warnings to consumers" based on its 
reading of recent Georgia jurisprudence in this area.94 
Some recent learned intermediary rule cases are more ambigu­
ous. The United States District Court for the District of South Da­
kota denied a plaintiff's motion to compel discovery related to 
direct-to-consumer advertising in a drug-related product liability 
action. In Schilfv. Eli Lilly & CO.,95 the court used two avenues of 
reasoning to reject a tort plaintiff's request for information on the 
defendant's direct marketing practices as part of its discovery. 
First, the court accepted the defendant's arguments that the state of 
South Dakota had already adopted the learned intermediary doc­
trine, so this evidence would not be relevant to a claim or defense in 
the case.96 Second, the court noted that "[p ]laintiffs are not factu­
ally positioned to persuasively argue that Lilly's direct marketing 
efforts rendered the prescribing doctor less important in choosing 
[the drug for plaintiff] to use, i.e. that the learned intermediary was 
not the person who selected" the treatment.97 
90. Id. at 1215, 1217 ("Allowing drug manufacturers to shift the burden of defec­
tive product to physicians would undermine the Supreme Court of New Mexico's con­
clusion that the burden should be on the manufacturer ...."). It is a weakness of the 
district court's reasoning that none of the cases on which it relies for its view of New 
Mexico's strict liability jurisprudence are pharmaceutical liability cases. 
91. Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 770 (Ky. 2004). 
92. Id. at 770-71 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting). 
93. Porter v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:06-CV-1297-JOF, 2008 WL 544739 (N.D. Ga. 
2008). 
94. Id. at *8-9. 
95. Schilf v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. CIV 07-4015, 2008 WL 4442557 (D.S.D. 2008). 
96. Id. at *1. 
97. /d. Although the thesis of this Article is that courts should consider direct-to­
consumer advertising relevant to the learned intermediary rule, if the Schilt court is 
correct that the plaintiff's "use of Cymbalta was not directly or indirectly related to 
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In Mendez Montes de Oca v. Adventis Pharma, the District 
Court for the District of Puerto Rico considered the learned inter­
mediary rule in the context of the plaintiff's allegations regarding 
direct-to-consumer advertising.98 The court held that the learned 
intermediary rule barred plaintiff's claim that defendant's synthetic 
insulin caused the decedent's cancer and subsequent death.99 How­
ever, a close reading of this case calls into question exactly what the 
court intended to hold with regard to direct-to-consumer advertis­
ing and the learned intermediary rule. While the court stated that 
no case since Perez had applied a direct-to-consumer exception to 
the rule,lOO the court also stated that "plaintiffs have failed to ex­
plain why the circumstances surrounding this particular product 
should trump the reasons for the rule."lOl Thus, it is a reasonable 
reading of the case that, although the court may be amenable to 
articulating a direct-to-consumer advertising exception in an appro­
priate case, the plaintiff in Mendez simply failed to make an ade­
quate showing to justify such a departure from traditional 
doctrine.102 This is buttressed by the court's conclusion that mere 
allegations "that defendant conducted direct to consumer advertis­
ing.... without more, is not sufficient to defeat defendant's learned 
intermediary defense. "103 
There has been more doctrinal movement in the last two years 
on this issue than in the previous six post-Perez years. While the 
ultimate doctrinal outcome is still in doubt, the courts should con­
tinue this trend, as a matter of common law tort doctrine, to modify 
the learned intermediary rule to allow the tort system to perform its 
traditional regulatory function in the context of prescription drug 
advertising. However, the courts should not, as West Virginia has 
done, throw out the baby with the bathwater. The Karl court, while 
it should be commended for its detailed attention to the changes in 
the health care marketplace over the last decade, went too far. It 
went even further than the New Jersey court in Perez, which was 
Lilly's direct marketing efforts," then the substantive outcome of this motion seems 
correct. Id. 
98. Mendez Montes de Oca v. Adventis Pharma, 579 F. Supp. 2d 222 (D.P.R. 
2008). 
99. Id. at 223. 
100. Id. at 228-29. The court did not cite or discuss Karl. 
101. Id. at 229. 
102. Id. at 230 ("Even assuming ... the direct to consumer advertising exception, 
the record in this case is devoid of any evidence intimating that decedent even saw 
informational material regarding [the drug] prior to his visit" to his physician.). 
103. Id. 
349 2009] REGULATING DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING 
the first to articulate the relationship between direct-to-consumer 
advertising and the learned intermediary rule. Perez held, in perti­
nent part, that 
when mass marketing of prescription drugs seeks to influence a 
patient's choice of drug, a pharmaceutical manufacturer that 
makes direct claims to consumers for the efficacy of its products 
should not be unqualifiedly relieved of a duty to provide proper 
warnings of the dangers or side effects of the product.I04 
This is a more nuanced approach to direct-to-consumer adver­
tising than the Karl court's wholesale rejection of the learned inter­
mediary doctrine. It recognizes that the existence of direct-to­
consumer advertising in a particular case should be grounds for an 
exception to the learned intermediary rule, not grounds for rejec­
tion of the rule altogether. In that respect, the courts in Schilt and 
Mendez, while they did not ultimately adopt a direct-to-consumer 
advertising exception, seem to be on the right track in what they 
implicitly require of plaintiffs to justify future adoption of such an 
exception. 
As I have previously argued, the courts should alter the appli­
cation of the learned intermediary rule to parallel the related but 
distinct "sophisticated user doctrine."lo5 Like the learned interme­
diary rule, the sophisticated user doctrine is applied in situations 
where warnings are given to an entity other than the end user of a 
product.106 Unlike the learned intermediary rule, however, the so­
phisticated user doctrine explicitly allows the court to analyze 
whether, in the context of a particular case, the decision to rely 
solely on a third-party intermediary to convey warnings to the end 
user was justifiable, thus shielding the defendant manufacturer 
from liability to the end user.107 
The main difficulty with the traditional application of the 
learned intermediary rule to cases involving direct-to-consumer ad­
vertising is that the rule does not permit an individualized determi­
nation of whether the so-called intermediary is actually performing 
the purported function that the law ascribed to her. lOS The classic 
formulation of the learned intermediary rule explicitly forecloses, in 
104. Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1247 (N.J. 1999) (emphasis 
added). 
105. Hall, supra note 43, at 239-44. 
106. Id. at 242. 
107. Id. at 242-44. 
108. Id. at 225. 
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exchange for judicial efficiency and ease of operation,109 an inquiry 
into the role of non-intermediary sources of information, including 
express attempts by the manufacturer to bypass the role of the in­
termediary and provide information directly to the potential 
consumer.ll 0 
Direct-to-consumer advertising is by definition advertising; in 
other words, it is not designed solely to convey information but to 
persuade. The effectiveness of this persuasion is evident by the re­
turn on investment of the manufacturers' direct advertising expend­
itures.ll ] If the practice of communicating directly with consumers 
was not efficient, profit-maximizing manufacturers would not en­
gage in it. This is not to say that all direct-to-consumer advertising 
oversteps appropriate boundaries. Yet, the continuing concern by 
Congress and consumer advocates over the content of many such 
ads,112 combined with demonstrably lax exercise of extant regula­
tory authority by the FDA,ll3 shows that additional oversight is 
needed. 
A tort regime that allows courts to inquire whether the market­
ing practices of drug manufacturers in fact undermine the role of 
the physician as gatekeeper to prescription drugs would at least in 
part cure the market distortions introduced and perpetuated by the 
current tort system. It would reintroduce a disincentive to oversell 
the potential benefits of advertised drugs. The learned intermedi­
ary rule should be revised to permit plaintiffs to prove that, in the 
factual context of any given case, a manufacturer's marketing prac­
tices unduly influenced the decision to seek and use a drug, thus 
resulting in harm. This will help ensure that the cost of harms are 
borne by the party bearing responsibility for that harm, while pre­
serving the concept of the physician as the primary, and most desir­
able, source for information about prescription drugs and other 
treatment options. 
First, the law should recognize that drug companies owe drug 
consumers a duty to present an accurate and balanced picture of 
the risks and benefits associated with a drug once the companies 
109. Girod, supra note 36, at 399-406. 
110. Hall, supra note 43, at 245-4S. 
111. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. It has been suggested that a two­
year moratorium on direct-to-consumer advertisements could cost the drug industry ten 
billion dollars in sales. See Aaron Smith, Banning Drug Ads Could Cost $1OB, CNN 
MONEY.COM, Aug. 1, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005IOS/01/news/fortune500/direct 
consumer/index.htm. 
112. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text. 
113. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
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make the choice to step beyond the traditional bounds of the physi­
cian-patient relationship and communicate directly with the con­
sumer via direct-to-consumer advertisements. Second, the law 
should recognize that this duty is breached when a company's direct 
marketing practices overemphasize benefit over risk or engage in 
other forms of overpromotion of the advertised drug. Third, such 
overpromotion should be acknowledged to cause legally cognizable 
damages when it can be shown that, but for the overpromotional 
activities of the manufacturer, the patient would not have used the 
drug. This proof could take the form of a showing that the patient 
was induced to obtain the drug outside normal physician-patient 
channels, such as through an Internet pharmacy that requires no 
meaningful physician interaction to generate a prescription; that the 
patient acted against medical advice in taking the drug; or that the 
patient engaged in doctor-shopping to obtain the drug in response 
to the manufacturer's promotional message. In any case, the mere 
presence of a licensed physician in the chain of distribution should 
no longer in and of itself dispose of the plaintiff's claim. 
This revision of the learned intermediary rule would not consti­
tute a radical expansion of tort law or require a wholesale rejection 
of the learned intermediary rule in the vast majority of cases. It 
would merely bring the law governing the duty to warn, in the phar­
maceutical context, in line with the duty to warn in other areas 
where a third-party intermediary is in a position to convey warnings 
to the ultimate users of a product.114 The drug manufacturer would 
benefit from a presumption that the traditional doctor-patient rela­
tionship ensures that the consumption of dangerous drugs is under­
taken only after an educated, informed consideration of risks and 
benefits,l15 However, unlike the current rule, that presumption 
should no longer be irrebuttable. 
114. See, e.g., Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the 
New Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193,221-23 (2004) (describ­
ing the "sophisticated user doctrine" under which warnings to third parties are, under 
certain circumstances, sufficient to discharge the duty to warn); 3 AMERICAN LAW OF 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY §33:16, at 30 (3d rev. ed. 2006) (A "supplier's duty to warn is 
discharged by providing information to third parties whom it can reasonably expect will 
communicate the information to the ultimate users. "). 
115. See, e.g., In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379 
(5th Cir. 1999). In that case the court, while adopting the learned intermediary rule to 
shield the manufacturer from liability, stated that even if the learned intermediary doc­
trine did not apply in cases involving direct-to-consumer advertising, no liability would 
attach if the plaintiff were not in fact exposed to, or did not rely on, the marketing 
claims of the manufacturer. 
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CONCLUSION 
Many of the characteristics of the current market for direct-to­
consumer advertisements are the result of an unequal set of incen­
tives for drug manufacturers. Virtually all of the market incentives 
are pro-advertisement, and there is a notable lack of incentives ei­
ther to advertise with the best interest of patients in mind, or to be 
conservative in avoiding deceptive or misleading advertisements. 
Recent developments show that voluntary advertising guidelines 
are not effective in preventing deceptive or misleading advertising 
practices. Further, under the failure-to-warn tort doctrine, as cur­
rently interpreted and applied, tort law is unable to act as an effec­
tive deterrent against irresponsible behavior. 
In the past two years, courts have shown a new willingness to 
consider claims that direct-to-consumer advertising undermines the 
rationale for the learned intermediary rule.116 State courts 
presented with the learned intermediary rule as a doctrine of first 
impression should follow the lead of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of West Virginia in Karl and carefully consider whether the extent 
of direct-to-consumer advertising justifies amendment, if not abro­
gation, of the rule in the context of claims in which plaintiffs claim 
reliance on overreaching advertisement and overpromotion.l17 
Federal courts applying state law should be reticent to assume that 
state courts would not take notice of the dramatically changed mar­
ketplace for information about prescription drugs in considering the 
contours of the learned intermediary rule. Finally, even in states 
where the learned intermediary doctrine has been adopted, plain­
tiffs' lawyers should make good faith arguments for the modifica­
tion of this doctrine in light of the increasing prevalence of, and 
issues surrounding, direct-to-consumer advertising. In this way, 
hopefully the common law will evolve an approach to pharmaceuti­
cal products liability litigation that reflects the complexity of the 
pharmaceutical marketplace. 
116. See supra notes 62-89 and accompanying text. 
117. See generally Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 
2007). 
